We provide a novel, inferential, account of the trait centrality phenomenon. We suggest that a trait possesses the property of ''centrality'' to the extent that it is subjectively deemed to imply other traits. Five studies explore four central elements of this view. First, trait relations can be stored as unidirectional rules (''if X then Y'' but not necessarily ''if Y then X''). Second, the strength of individuals' lay inference rules determines the effect of traits on impressions. Third, situationally manipulating the strength of lay inference rules influences the impact of traits on impressions. Fourth, the impact of an inference rule is reduced when it is difficult to discern the inference rule and when processing resources are limited.
When the task of processing the evidentiary information is difficult, individuals might not be able to perceive its relevance as readily as in circumstances in which the task is easy (see Chun, Spiegel, & Kruglanski, 2002; Erb, Kruglanski, Chun, Pierro, Mannetti, & Spiegel, 2003) . Therefore, the influence of the inference rules may also depend on the difficulty of gleaning the (subjectively) relevant evidence from the environment. For instance, if the trait information is difficult to discern, its ''signal to noise'' ratio being low, participants might not fully appreciate the relevance of the warm-cold information to their friendliness or likeability judgments, whereas if it was easy to discern, the warm-cold information might exert a more powerful influence. However, the difficulty of information processing may be successfully overcome if the knower has sufficient cognitive capacity to cope with the cognitive task at hand.
OVERVIEW OF PRESENT RESEARCH
To the extent that the foregoing account of the trait centrality phenomenon is valid, the following five hypotheses are implied. First, trait relations can be stored as unidirectional rules rather than bidirectional correlations (''if X then Y,'' but not necessarily ''if Y then X''). Second, the strength of individuals' lay inference rules should mediate the effect of a given trait on judgment regarding a target person. Third, situations that induce rule strength should appropriately affect the trait centrality phenomenon. Fourth, the use of a lay inference rule should depend on the difficulty of gleaning the appropriate evidence from the environment. Fifth, the difficulty of gleaning the evidence should impact those who are under cognitive load to a greater extent than those who have available their full processing capacity.
To explore these notions, we carried out five experimental studies. Study 1 examined the asymmetry of trait pair relations. Study 2 tested whether the strength of individuals' lay inference rules mediates the effect of a trait on target impressions. Study 3 manipulated rule strength experimentally and examined the effect of this manipulation on trait effects on impressions. Study 4 investigated whether difficult to detect evidence is less likely to activate an inference rule and to impact impression formation. Finally, Study 5 manipulated cognitive load to determine whether the difficulty of detection affects individuals with limited processing resources to a greater extent than it does individuals with ample processing resources.
STUDY 1: UNIDIRECTIONAL IMPLICATIONS ACROSS 50 TRAIT PAIRS
Study 1 was designed to assess the asymmetry of relations between trait pairs, across 50 pairs. In order to assess the asymmetry of the trait pairs, we assessed the perception of (1) the strength of the rule ''if trait A, then trait B'' and (2) the strength of the rule ''if trait B, then trait A.'' If trait relations can be stored as directional ''if. . . then'' rules, then we should find that one of the implicational rules (e.g., if A, then B) can differ significantly from the converse rule (e.g., if B, then A). However, if trait relations are stored exclusively as correlations, then we should find that A implies B to the same extent that B implies A.
Method

Participants
One hundred twenty-nine University of Maryland undergraduates (83 females and 46 males) participated in the experiment in exchange for course credit.
Procedure
Participants completed two questionnaires as part of the study on ''Social Judgment.'' In order to assess the strength of the ''if. . . then'' rules, the first questionnaire asked participants about their agreement with the statement ''if someone is A, then s/he is B.'' A and B were replaced in the sentence with each of the 50 trait pairs in Table 1 . Participants responded on a nine-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). The second questionnaire assessed the reverse implicational direction, and asked participants to rate their agreement with the statement ''if someone is B, then s/he is A,'' using the same nine-point rating scale. We counterbalanced the order of these questionnaires across participants.
The trait pairs we used were drawn from Anderson's (1968) list of traits, and based on the intuition that the traits within each pair would be perceived as somewhat related to one another. However, our main interest was to assess whether such related traits are invariably linked in a bidirectional manner, or if instead, they may be cognitively linked unidirectionally according to ''if. . . then'' implications that a given trait may have for another but not vice versa.
Results and Discussion
In order to examine asymmetry in trait pair relations, we first calculated within-trait pair association difference scores by subtracting the perceived strength of association between trait A and trait B from the perceived strength of association between trait B and trait A. A one-sample t-test revealed that the total of difference scores, with all negative difference scores reversed to positive scores, was significantly greater than 0, at t(125) ¼ 12.51, p < .001, providing strong evidence for overall asymmetry in the relation of trait pair representation. Separate, pair wise t-tests across the 50 traits showed that 23 of the trait pairs showed differences as a function of order at the p < .05 level. For four additional trait pairs, trait pair order made a marginally significant difference, at p < .10. The results of these t-tests for all trait pairs are depicted in Table 1 .
Overall, the present findings are consistent with the assertion that trait pair relations can be (and often are) cognitively connected in a unidirectional rather than bidirectional way. The difference found between the implication ''If A. . . then B'' and ''If B. . . then A'' seems to be inconsistent with, and raises problems for, a correlational account (Wishner, 1960) . This does not mean that all or most of the myriad possible trait relations are asymmetrical. Nonetheless, because many of the trait relations in this study did turn out to be asymmetrical, the possibility of unidirectional rules was corroborated by our data. Moreover, the present framework can account for those pairs which are symmetrical, that is, involve bidirectional implications. Specifically, symmetrical trait relations occur when the knower believes that A implies B to the same extent that B implies A. In contrast, looking merely at the correlations between traits (Wishner, 1960 ) not only ignores asymmetrical trait relations, but fails to specify the epistemic mechanism of inferring ones' impressions of a target from trait information that serves as evidence in the ''if. . . then'' syllogistic manner described earlier. This aspect of our analysis is explored more specifically below.
In Study 1, we found a significant difference between the endorsement of the rule ''if A. . . then B'' and the rule ''if B. . . then A'' across 50 trait pairs. An alternative interpretation of this finding could be that each of the measurements of the two implicational rules merely measures the correlation between A and B. In this sense, the difference between the two rules could reflect low test-retest reliability in the measurement of the correlation using this method. Such an explanation essentially argues that the reason we found the differences in Study 1 was not because traits are stored as unidirectional implications, but instead because the measurement procedure used in Study 1 was unreliable. If this is the case, then the measurement of the trait relations using this procedure should not be predictive of perceivers judgments based on the presence of warmth/coldness information. Study 2 was designed to test whether measuring the extent to which trait A implies trait B (in this manner) mediates the relationship between the presence of trait A and judgments about trait B.
STUDY 2: RULE STRENGTH EFFECTS ON IMPRESSION FORMATION
Given that trait relations can be represented in the form of unidirectional rules (Study 1), we expect that the strength of the stored rule should influence the extent to which trait evidence will lead to its implied judgment. Accordingly, the present experiment tested whether the strength of individuals' inference rules mediate the effect of a ''central'' trait on judgment regarding a target person. Specifically, we assessed the strength of participants' lay inference rules, conditionally relating warmth to friendliness and speed to athletic talent, before evaluating their interest in having a target person as a friend, or recruiting him to their basketball team. It was predicted that the presence of an inference rule (i.e., a major premise to which an individual may subscribe) mediates the effect of trait information on corresponding judgments.
Method
Participants
Seventy-seven University of Chicago undergraduates (41 females and 36 males) participated in the experiment in return for monetary compensation.
Procedure
This study employed a 2: Trait (warm vs. fast) Â 2: Role (friend vs. basketball player) between-subject design. Half the participants read about a target person supposedly interested in being their friend, whereas the remaining participants read about a target person interested in joining their basketball team. Participants were presented with a list of traits that this target person possessed. The trait list included the adjectives: Intelligent, skillful, industrious, warm (vs. fast), practical, and cautious.
Next, for each trait on the trait list, participants in the friendship condition rated the extent to which the trait indicated that a person is a good friend (i.e., ''given that someone is X, would you assume that s/he is friendly?''), whereas participants in the basketball-player condition rated the extent to which each trait indicated that a person is a good basketball player (i.e., given that someone is X, would you assume that s/he is a good basketball player?''). All ratings were made on seven-point scales (1 ¼ cannot assume, 7 ¼ can assume for sure). Although we were only interested in the perceived diagnostic value of ''warm'' and ''fast,'' in order to conceal the purpose of the study, we repeated this item for each trait on the trait list. Next, participants were asked to evaluate the extent to which they would like to have the target person as their friend or as a player in their basketball team, depending on experimental condition (on a seven-point scale, ranging from 1 ¼ not at all, to 7 ¼ extremely).
Results and Discussion
An ANOVA of target person's evaluations yielded a trait Â role interaction, F(1, 73) ¼ 9.01, p < .01, indicating that ratings of interest in friendship were higher for the warm target (M ¼ 4.79) than for the fast target (M ¼ 4.10), t(37) ¼ 2.52, p ¼ .01, whereas ratings of interest in having the person join their basketball team were higher for the fast target (M ¼ 4.55) than for the warm target (M ¼ 3.56), t(36) ¼ 2.01, p ¼ .05. No other effects emerged in this analysis.
Next, a series of regression analyses tested whether the observed effect on evaluations is mediated by the strength of lay inference rules, relating warmth and friendship, and athletic skills and fastness. As shown in Figure 1 , beginning with the evaluation of basketball potential, this analysis found that in itself, the central trait adjective (fast vs. warm) directly increased interest in hiring the target person (b ¼ .38, p ¼ .01). However, indirectly, fastness (vs. warmth) was rated as a better predictor of basketball talent (b ¼ .71, p < .01), which in turn increased interest in having the target person on their basketball team (b ¼ .64, p < .01). Of greatest interest, controlling for the predictive diagnosticity of fastness, the effect of central trait on interest in having the person on their basketball team diminished (b ¼ .11, ns). The Sobel test statistic found that diagnosticity significantly mediated the interest in having the person on their basketball team (z ¼ 3.37, p < .001).
The same analysis, conducted on the friendliness ratings, yielded a similar pattern. In itself, the central trait adjective (warm vs. fast) directly increased interest in having the target person as a friend (b ¼ .54, p < .01). However, indirectly, warmth (vs. fastness) was rated as a better predictor of friendliness (b ¼ .84, p < .01), which in turn increased the interest in friendship (b ¼ .61, p < .01). Controlling for the diagnosticity of warmth, the effect of this trait on interest in friendship diminished (b ¼ .08, ns). In this case as well, the Sobel statistic attested that diagnosticity significantly mediated the interest in friendship (z ¼ 2.06, p < .05).
The present results demonstrate the dependence of the trait centrality effect on the strength of participants' lay inference rules. Specifically, if the impact of a stimulus trait on other aspects of person perception (e.g., friendliness or basketball ability) depends on the degree to which individuals believe in an ''if. . . then'' relation between a given trait and a given perception, one should expect to eliminate the effect of trait centrality by controlling for participants' subscription to the inference rule. Accordingly, the degree to which participants believed that warmth (vs. fastness) indicates friendliness mediated the degree to which they viewed themselves likely to adopt a warm person as their friend. Similarly, the degree to which participants believed that fastness (vs. warmth) implies athleticism mediated the degree to which they were likely to recruit a fast person to their basketball team. These findings underscore the fact that the phenomenon of trait centrality does not have to do with specific traits as such but rather with the degree to which the traits are seen to constitute compelling evidence for given impressions.
In addition, the results from Study 2 provide additional support for our interpretation of the results in Study 1. In Study 1, we found a significant difference between ratings of ''if A. . . then B'' as compared to ''if B. . . then A'' across 50 trait pairs. We suggested that this finding could be interpreted as evidence that trait relations are stored as unidirectional implications. An alternative interpretation of these findings could suggest that the significant difference between the ratings merely indicates a lack of test-retest reliability in the assessment of stored associations. Because the measurement of unidirectional rules in Study 2 was a reliable mediator of the use of given information to make a subsequent judgment, we can be confident that the results from Study 1 were not the result of unreliable measurement of the trait relations. If our procedure for measuring the trait relations was as poor as would be needed to produce significant differences in the ratings over only a few moments, then such ratings should not be able to reliably mediate the trait centrality effect, as found in Study 2.
One limitation of Study 2 is that the measurement of the strength of lay inference rules occurred between the presentation of the information about the target person and the judgments about the target person. To conceal the nature of this measurement, we included in the questionnaire presented to participants all items from the trait checklist. However, this might not have fully removed demands towards consistency. To address these issues, Study 3 systematically manipulated participants' strength of lay inference rules and examined the effect of such manipulation on participants' impressions.
STUDY 3: MANIPULATING THE STRENGTH OF LAY INFERENCE RULES
Study 2 suggests that individuals vary in the strength of the ''if. . . then'' rule that in their mind connect two trait items in an implicational relation. Such differences may stem from the history of association between these terms, which may well differ substantially across individuals. In the present study, we attempted to create such history experimentally. Study 3 systematically manipulated participants' strength of lay inference rules and examined the effect of such manipulation on participants' impressions. Specifically, we repeatedly paired the terms ''warm'' and ''like'' and ''cold'' and ''dislike'' in the experimental condition and observed the degree to which the ''warm/cold'' trait in the stimulus list affects the inference that the target is ''likeable/unlikable.'' In a control condition, participants went immediately to the judgment task, without any previous task. This allows us to compare individuals with a recent history of association between warmth and likeability to individuals with no recent history of association between these dimensions. We expect that activating the association between warmth and likeability will increase the trait centrality effect.
In order to test for the possibility that the experimental condition simply activates the construct of warmth, or simply activates the concept of likeability (rather than the association between them), we also included a condition in which only the warm-cold dimension is primed, and a condition in which only the likeability dimension is primed. Specifically, we repeatedly presented the terms ''warm'' and ''cold'' in the warmth condition and repeatedly presented the terms ''like'' and dislike'' in the likeability condition.
After the manipulation of the accessibility of the warmth-likeability association, we then measured the degree to which the ''warm/cold'' trait in the stimulus list affects the inference that the target is ''likeable/unlikable.''
Method
Participants
One-hundred-five University of Maryland undergraduates (77 females and 28 males) participated in the experiment in fulfillment of course requirements.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to the 4: Prime (warmth-likeability vs. warmth vs. likeability vs. no prime) Â 2: Trait (warm vs. cold) conditions. The first part of the experiment manipulated the association strength between the warm/cold and likeable/dislikeable terms intended to vary the strength of the ''if warm then likeable'' (''if cold then dislikeable'') rules. That is, participants in the warmth-likeable condition responded to eight questions to which the answers were registered on a scale anchored at the ends with the terms ''warm'' and ''cold'' (e.g., What is the weather today? What is the ideal temperature for serving coffee?). Interspersed among these items were eight questions to which the answers were recorded on a scale anchored with ''like'' and ''dislike'' (e.g., What is you opinion of rock music? What is your opinion of George W. Bush?). The ''warm'' and the ''like'' anchors were placed at the same ends of the scale, as were the opposite anchors, ''cold'' and ''dislike.'' In the warmth condition, participants responded to 16 questions to which the answers were recorded on a scale anchored with the terms ''warm'' and ''cold'' (e.g., What is the weather today? What is the ideal temperature for serving coffee?). In the likeability condition, participants responded to 16 questions to which the answers were recorded on a scale anchored with the terms ''like'' and ''dislike'' (e.g., What is you opinion of rock music? What is your opinion of George W. Bush?). All ratings were recorded on a seven-point scale. Participants in the no prime condition did not respond to any questions and commenced directly with the second part of the study.
The second part of the experiment required participants to respond to another, allegedly unrelated, survey said to investigate impression formation. The first part of the experimental survey introduced the impression formation task. Participants were asked to imagine that ''Mike is interested in being your friend.'' Next, participants read about Mike who, ''according to a reliable source is: Intelligent, skillful, industrious, cold (or warm), practical, and cautious.'' Next, target evaluation scores were obtained by asking participants to rate their readiness to accept Mike as their friend. At that point, we assessed the effect of the manipulated traits on evaluation of friendship related characteristics by asking participants to rate the extent to which they believed Mike to be (1) insightful, (2) in possession of good social skills, (3) invested in his friendships, (4) a good practical advice giver, and someone who (5) worries about his friends. All ratings were made on seven-point scales.
Results and Discussion
Friendship Ratings
A 4: Prime (warmth-likeability vs. warmth vs. likeability vs. no prime) Â 2: Trait (warm vs. cold) ANOVA performed on participants' interest ratings in having the target person as a friend yielded a main effect for the trait variable, F(1, 97) ¼ 46.60, p < .001, indicating that participants preferred the warm over the cold target as their friend (Ms ¼ 5.33 and 4.00, respectively). As shown in Figure 2 , this analysis also revealed the predicted prime Â trait interaction, F(1, 97) ¼ 2.40, p ¼ .07. Next, we computed planned comparisons investigating the difference between the friendship ratings between the warm target and the cold target.
Replicating the general trait centrality effect, even in the no-prime condition participants expressed greater interest in establishing friendship with the warm rather than the cold target (Ms ¼ 5.00 and 4.00, respectively) F(1, 97) ¼ 7.74, p < .01. Similarly, in the warmth condition participants' expressed greater interest in establishing friendship with the warm rather than the cold target (Ms ¼ 5.08 and 4.17, respectively) F(1, 97) ¼ 5.19, p < .05, as was the case in the likeability condition (Ms ¼ 5.67 and 4.46, respectively) F(1, 97) ¼ 9.10, p < .01. Participants in the warmth-likeable condition were even more interested in striking a friendship with the warm, as compared to the cold target (Ms ¼ 5.58 and 3.36, respectively) F(1, 97) ¼ 35.16, p < .001.
Impressions of Target
Next, we collapsed the ratings of the target's friendship-related traits (a ¼ .69). A 2: Prime: 4 (warmth-likeability vs. warmth vs. likeability vs. no prime) Â trait (warm vs. cold) ANOVA carried out on this measure yielded a main effect for trait, F(1, 97) ¼ 43.08, p < .001 (Ms ¼ 5.09 and 4.09 for the 'warm' and 'cold' targets, respectively). Of greater interest, we obtained a marginally significant interaction between the prime Â trait variables, F(1, 97) ¼ 2.42, p ¼ .07.
We then computed planned comparisons investigating the difference between the impressions between the warm target and the cold target in each of the prime conditions. In the no-prime condition participants reported a (marginally significant) more positive view of the target's traits when he was portrayed as warm rather than cold (Ms ¼ 4.76 and 4.20, respectively) F(1, 97) ¼ 3.77, p ¼ .06. In the warmth prime condition participants' impressions of the warm target were significantly more positive than the cold target (Ms ¼ 5.00 and 4.2, respectively) F(1, 97) ¼ 6.63, p < .05. In the likeability condition participants' reported a preference for establishing friendship with the warm rather than the cold target (Ms ¼ 5.13 and 4.15, respectively) F(1, 97) ¼ 9.95, p < .01. In the warmth-likeable condition the warm versus cold targets were evaluated more extremely than in the low accessibility conditions (Ms ¼ 5.47 and 3.81, respectively) F(1, 97) ¼ 29.31, p < .001.
These results affirm that the ''if warm then likeable'' inference rule was generally available to our participants. However, enhancing its strength via our experimental manipulation increased participants' tendency to use it in judgments, resulting in significant interactions regarding the readiness to accept the target as a friend, and regarding the Figure 2 . Evaluation of target as a function of association history and trait information (study 3) t(39) ¼ 7.17, p < .001), than when the font was blurry and difficult to read (Ms ¼ 5.06 and 3.80, for warm vs. cold, t(36) ¼ 2.99, p < .01).
We then analyzed the ratings of the target's friendship-related traits (a ¼ .65). An ANOVA yielded a main effect for trait, F(1, 77) ¼ 33.80, p < .001 and the predicted difficulty Â trait interaction, F(1, 77) ¼ 4.16, p < .05. Again, even in the blurry font condition participants evaluated the warm versus cold target more positively (Ms ¼ 4.49 and 3.83, for warm vs. cold, t(38) ¼ 2.66, p < .05), but this effect was significantly larger in the clear font condition (Ms ¼ 5.12 and 3.75, warm vs. cold, t(39) ¼ 5.66, p < .001) than when it was difficult.
These findings suggest that people are less likely to rely on available evidence (i.e., trait information) when it is difficult to process, presumably because they do not appreciate its potential relevance to the judgment. It also follows that when the trait information is difficult to process and one's available cognitive resources are low (e.g., under cognitive load), the effect of the trait information will diminish even more completely. In contrast, having ample cognitive resources should reduce the impact of the difficult to process information. Our next study explored these possibilities by replicating the blurry-font conditions under cognitive load (vs. no load).
STUDY 5: DIFFICULTY OF INFORMATION PROCESSING AND COGNITIVE RESOURCES
As noted above, processing resources may play a particular role when the judgmental task was difficult to carry out for some reason, e.g., due to length or complexity of the information, poor visibility, ambient noise, etc. (for discussion see Chun et al., 2002; Erb et al., 2003; Kruglanski, Fishbach, Erb, Pierro, & Mannetti, 2004; Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a,b) . Accordingly, we predicted that when the task demands are high (e.g., when the fonts are blurry) limiting processing resources by the imposition of cognitive load would diminish the effect of the trait information as compared to the case where the processing resources are plentiful.
Method
Participants
Ninety-two University of Maryland undergraduates (70 females and 22 males) participated in the experiment in fulfillment of course requirements. project on the relationship between font types and readability, which justified the use of blurry fonts in all conditions. Participants in the high cognitive-load condition were further told that another interest of the study was to investigate how well people can perform two different tasks simultaneously. Before participants examined the information about Mike, they were asked to recite a nine-digit number silently to themselves until they were later asked to reproduce it Chun et al., 2002) . At that point, participants were allowed to view the number for 25 seconds. Their counterparts in the low cognitive-load condition proceeded without these instructions. Participants were then asked to imagine someone that they trust tells them that a target person is ''intelligent, skillful, industrious, warm (vs. cold) , determined, practical, and cautious.'' Time allowed for reading the target person's traits was 25 seconds, which according to a pretest was sufficient for a thorough reading the traits. At that point, prior to responding to the dependent measures, participants in the high cognitive-load condition were asked to reproduce the nine-digit number they had been asked to recite. Therefore, none of the participants experienced high cognitive-load while responding to the dependent measures.
After reading the stimulus list, participants were provided with 10 traits (i.e., generous, wise, happy, good-natured, humorous, sociable, popular, humane, altruistic, and imaginative). These traits were shown to be reliably influenced by the central traits manipulation (i.e., warm vs. cold) in Asch's (1946) original experiments and therefore, they enabled us to (a) replicate the original findings and (b) test for moderation, using the exact same evaluative measures as Asch. We specifically asked participants to report the extent to which Mike is a person who has each trait on a nine-point scale (1 ¼ not at all, 9 ¼ extremely).
Results and Discussion
An ANOVA of the target's friendship-related traits yielded a main effect for trait, F(1, 88) ¼ 9.57, p < .01, with more positive evaluation of the warm target than the cold one. More importantly, it yielded the predicted cognitive load Â trait interaction, F(1, 88) ¼ 4.47, p < .05. As shown in Figure 4 , under no load participants evaluated the warm versus cold target more positively (Ms ¼ 6.10 and 4.61, for warm vs. cold), t(42) ¼ 4.08, p < .001; however, under cognitive load, the warm and cold targets were not significantly different from each other (Ms ¼ 5.77 and 5.50, for warm vs. cold), t(46) ¼ .65, ns. We conclude that when the task demands are high (as a result of unclear fonts) and people's processing resources are low, trait information will not affect the impression formed.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present epistemic analysis and results suggest that understanding the trait-centrality phenomenon and the variables that affect it may be advanced by considering it as a specific instance of a general judgmental process. Trait centrality varies as a function of individuals' lay inference rules, of momentary and chronic conditions affecting the strength of belief in such inferences (rule strength), and the ability to glean the relevant evidence instantiating the use of such rules. We assumed that a trait exhibits the property of centrality to the extent that it constitutes subjectively relevant evidence for a social judgment. Rather than some traits possessing a ''central content'' in the absolute sense of the term, trait ''centrality'' may depend on these traits' relation to judgmental dimensions. Contrary to Wishner's (1960) analysis of the trait centrality phenomenon, the present epistemic account of the trait centrality phenomenon suggests that trait centrality does not necessarily require that the trait and the judgment be correlated in the strict sense of this term. A correlation (or conjunctive presence-absence) implies that a trait is both a sufficient and a necessary condition for a judgment. According to the present analysis, however, sufficiency is enough, for the evidential function of traits should depend on their presumed ''if. . . then'' relation to particular judgments. Consistent with these notions, Study 1 demonstrated that a judgment Y may be inferred from trait X on basis of an ''if X then Y'' relation (a sufficiency condition), without assuming also an ''if Y then X'' relation (defining the necessity of X to Y).
Locating the phenomenon of trait centrality in the evidential function of information, grounded in the concept of subjective relevance (Kruglanski, Erb, Pierro, Mannetti, & Chun, 2006; also suggests that the trait centrality effect may vary as function of a number of factors beyond the general relation across individuals between trait X and judgment Y. An important such factor is the specific presumed relation between the two, depending on the strength of individuals' lay inference rules. This suggests that trait centrality may vary as function of individual differences in the strength of the inference rule or the major premise (the ''if X then Y'' supposition).
Consistent with these notions, Study 2 showed that individuals' lay belief in inference rules, which attest to the perceived relevance that given traits have for given judgmental dimension, mediate trait centrality effects. Controlling for those inference rules eliminated the differences in impressions of the target as a function of the manipulated traits. Studies 3a and 3b demonstrated that situationally varying the strength of lay inferences rules determined the use of the information in judgments of social stimuli.
In order for a particular inference rule to be used, the antecedent term must be available and accessible in the informational array, leading to a judgment consistent with the consequent term. As such, Study 4 found that when processing the relevant antecedent term was made difficult, judgments consistent with the consequent term were less likely. Moreover, Study 5 found that the effect of task demands is particularly strong for those who have limited processing resources available while processing the information.
These results are consistent with the notion that information that a target possesses a given trait may function as evidence for inferences about other traits, on condition that the particular trait is subjectively relevant to those inferences. Trait centrality, then, is assumed to be the extent to which a specific trait implies other traits, and will influence judgment to the extent that the inference rule is believed and the evidence can be gleaned.
Another conceptual approach that has been used to understand impression formation has been the use of mathematical and simulation models, including connectionist models (e.g., Van Overwalle & Labiouse, 2004) . Our implicational approach is consistent with this type of modeling to the extent that the linkages between informational nodes are unidirectional. That is, the strength of the linkage moving from node A to node B can have a different weight than the strength of the linkage moving from node B to node A. Indeed, it seems that a connectionist model in which a specific value is assigned to the ''if A. . . then B'' linkage that can be different from the ''if B. . . then A'' linkage would have greater predictive power.
Alternative Interpretations
Thus far, we have discussed the importance of our findings for an epistemic approach to human perception and judgment. The main alternative to such an approach is found in associationistic models. The data presented here is problematic for an associationistic account in at least two ways. First, associationistic models assume that traits are stored according to bidirectional linkages. Yet, we found that (a) the strength of believe in trait relations differs depending on the directional implication, and (b) the lay belief in directional trait relations mediates the trait centrality effect. These findings suggest that informational nodes may be connected by directional linkages (as is assumed in an inferential account) rather than bidirectional linkages (as would be assumed in an associationistic account). Second, associationistic models assume that stored associations would be readily used when the judgmental task was difficult or when cognitive resources are low (for a review, see Kruglanski & Orehek, 2007) . In fact, associationistic models argue that stored associations are used more as processing demands increase (as compared to when processing demands are lower). Yet, making the information difficult to read and introducing cognitive load disrupted the use of the stored associations.
Taken together, the findings from the six studies make alternative interpretations of the findings cumbersome. In Study 1, we found a significant difference between the endorsement of the rule ''if A. . . then B'' and the rule ''if B. . . then A'' across 50 trait pairs. It could be argued that each of the measurements of the two implicational rules merely measures the association between A and B. In this sense, the difference between the two rules could reflect low test-retest reliability in the measurement of the association using this method. However, this account would make it impossible to interpret the results from Study 2. In Study 2 it was found that the measurement of implicational rules (using the same question format as Study 1) mediated the trait centrality effect. If the reliability of measurement was so low in Study 1 as to undermine the importance of the difference in ratings according to the direction of the implication, then the measurement should not have been able to be a reliable predictor in Study 2.
Taken together, the results from these studies corroborate our epistemic approach, and raise significant problems for associationistic accounts. Because of this, the most plausible interpretation of our data seems to be an inferential account. Yet, it is impossible to directly measure the specific way in which information is stored in memory. Future research could profitably explore this topic using different methods to provide further evidence with respect to the two alternative approaches.
